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Post-Accession Conditionality  
Support Instrument for Continuous Pressure?
Eli Gateva
Abstract
The establishment of a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for monitoring Bulgaria’s and Romania’s 
progress in the areas of judiciary and fight against corruption not only confirms the evolutionary nature 
of EU conditionality, but introduces a new feature, that of post-accession conditionality. More than three 
years after accession, neither Bulgaria nor Romania have managed to tackle the remaining issues and the 
scrupulous monitoring mechanism is still maintained. What are the main features and limitations of post-
accession conditionality? Why does the effectiveness of EU conditionality deteriorate after accession? 
The article outlines a conceptual framework for comparative study of pre-accession and post-accession 
conditionality. On the basis of a stage-structured conditionality model, it discusses the transformations 
of the main elements of conditionality before and after accession and argues that the absence of 
accession advancement rewards combined with toothless explicit threats for sanctioning non-compliance 
produce very weak negative incentive structure which undermines the effectiveness of post-accession 
conditionality. The study, which draws on extensive interviews with senior EU officials and examination 
of key EU documents, highlights the growing application of differentiated and targeted conditionality 
and concludes with a reflection on the future of the mechanism and its implications for the ongoing 
enlargement of the Union with countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey.
The Author
Eli Gateva is a member of the Centre for Comparative Politics (CCP) at the University 
of Manchester. She is currently working on her doctoral thesis which examines the 
evolution of EU enlargement conditionality. Her main research interests cover EU 
Enlargement policy, EU Conditionality, Europeanization and transition, and regional 
development in Central and South East Europe.     
Contact: eli.gateva@manchester.ac.uk
4 | KFG Working Paper No. 18 | October 2010 
Contents
1.   Introduction         5 
           
2.   Revisiting EU Conditionality in the Context of Post-Accession                                        
      Conditionality         6
      2.1   Stage-Structured Conditionality Model for Comparative    
              Examination of EU Enlargement Conditionality    7
       
3.   Comparative Examination of Pre-Accession and Post-Accession
      Conditionality         12
      3.1   Comparative Examination of Pre-Accession and Post-Accession              
              Conditions         12
      3.2   Comparative Examination of Pre-Accession and Post-Accession                      
  Monitoring Instruments       14
      3.3   Comparative Examination of Pre-Accession and Post-Accession
   Incentive Structure        16
4.   Conclusion: Limitations of Post-Accession Conditionality and the  
      Future of EU Enlargement Conditionality      21 
    
      
Literature          23 
          
                                  Post-Accession Conditionality  | 5
1.  Introduction1
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU on 1 January 2007 marked the completion of the fifth 
enlargement of the Union with countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), Cyprus and Malta. 
Although Bulgaria and Romania were “part of the same inclusive and irreversible enlargement process” 
(Council of the European Union 2003) their accession was subject to unprecedented safeguards and 
monitoring. Unlike new member states which joined the Union on 1 May 2004, Bulgaria and Romania 
had to accept an additional “super safeguard” clause which allowed the EU to postpone their accession 
by one year. Although the clause was not activated, the Commission concluded that further progress was 
still necessary in the area of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and set up the Cooperation 
and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in order to monitor progress in these areas after the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania. The new measures not only confirm the evolutionary nature of EU conditionality, 
but introduce a new feature, that of post-accession conditionality. More than three years after accession 
there is a growing sense of frustration in Brussels as neither Bulgaria nor Romania have managed to tackle 
the remaining issues. The Commission has systematically criticized the new members over the slow speed 
of the reforms and the lack of tangible results. 
The 2008 Progress Reports confirmed that “progress has been slower and more limited than expected” and 
that “the need for verification and cooperation will continue for some time” (European Commission 2008c: 
2, 2008d: 2). The July 2009 Progress Reports concluded that “continuous pressure for delivery is needed” 
and that the CVM “will be maintained until these reforms are achieved” (European Commission 2009c:8, 
2009d: 8f). Although the safeguard clauses (which empower the Commission to sanction non-compliance 
and lack of sufficient progress) expired on 1 January 2010, the Commission did not decide to remove 
the application of the mechanism. The latest reports, which were published on 20 July 2010, highlighted 
“important shortcomings in Romania’s efforts to achieve progress under the CVM” and confirmed that 
“important deficiencies remain in judicial practice” in Bulgaria (European Commission 2010c:3, 2010d: 2).
Despite the growing body of literature on EU conditionality, the CVM and post-accession conditionality 
remain undertheorized. What are the main features and limitations of post-accession conditionality? 
Why does the effectiveness of EU conditionality deteriorate after accession? In order to address these 
questions, the article elaborates on the existing literature on EU conditionality and outlines a conceptual 
framework for comparative study of pre-accession and post-accession conditionality. The article draws on 
extensive interviews with senior EU officials and examination of key EU documents.
1 This paper was prepared for the Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) Conference “The Transformative Power of Europe”, 
11-12 December 2009. I would like to thank University Association for Contemporary European Studies for their 
generous support of my field trip to Brussels. Between May 2009 – August 2009, I conducted more than 80 
interviews with Members and Heads of the Van der Broek Cabinet, Verheugen Cabinet, Rehn Cabinet, Deputy Di-
rector-General; Directorate Directors, Heads of Units and Members of the Directorate General for Enlargement; 
Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security; Directorate-General for External Relations and General 
Secretariat of the European Commission; Members of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(AFET); Members and Heads of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; National officials 
from the permanent representations of existing member states and missions of candidate countries to the EU. 
Most of the respondents preferred not to have their names attached to specific quotations. The interviews de-
monstrated a virtual consensus that Bulgaria’s and Romania’s progress towards meeting the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM) benchmarks has been slower and more difficult than expected. The article uses 
quotations from three senior EU officials who have been directly involved in the process of the creation and the 
regular monitoring of the CVM.
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The article is structured in three parts. The first part highlights key features of EU conditionality and 
outlines a theoretical framework for comparative examination of pre-accession and post-accession 
conditionality. On the basis of a stage-structured conditionality model, the second part discusses the 
transformations of the main elements of conditionality before and after accession and argues that the 
absence of accession advancement rewards combined with toothless explicit threats for sanctioning non-
compliance produce very weak negative incentive structure which undermines the effectiveness of post-
accession conditionality. The third part highlights the growing application of targeted and differentiated 
conditionality and reflects on the future of the CVM and its implications for the ongoing enlargement of 
the Union with countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey.
2.  Revisiting EU Conditionality in the Context of Post-Accession Conditionality
Following the completion of the fifth enlargement, research focus has gradually shifted to studying new 
member states’ compliance with EU rules. Post-accession compliance has been addressed by a growing 
number of academic studies, which cover a wide range of policy areas from minority protection (Sasse 
2008; Schwellnus et al. 2009) and gender equality (Sedelmeier 2009) to working time and equal treatment 
in the workplace (Falkner/Trieb 2008) and Euro-zone conditionality (Johnson 2008). However, most of 
the existing literature focuses on the eight new member states which acceded to the EU in 2004 with 
very few studies on Bulgaria and/or Romania (Trauner 2009; Levitz/Pop-Eleches 2010; Pridham 2007; 
Primatarova 2010). It is not only Bulgaria’s and Romania’s lengthier and more troublesome accession 
process (Papadimitriou/Gateva 2009) which makes the newest members of the Union intriguing case 
studies. More importantly the establishment of the CVM to monitor progress towards meeting the sets 
of benchmarks has singled out Bulgaria and Romania as the only two countries subject to continuous 
scrutiny by the Commission after their accession to the Union. Furthermore, Bulgaria’s and Romania’s 
mixed record of post-accession compliance poses a very interesting puzzle. On one hand, the EU data 
shows that “Bulgaria and Romania have done very well with regard to the transposition of EU legislation” 
and that “Bulgaria was actually the first member state to achieve a transposition deficit of 0% in 2008” 
(Trauner 2009: 8). These findings correspond to Steunenberg and Toshkov’s comparative research on 
transposition in all 27 member states which confirms that “new member states do no worse than the old 
and more experienced member states in transposing directives on time” (2009: 952). On the other hand, 
both Bulgaria and Romania have continuously been criticized by the Commission for lack of sufficient 
progress and tangible results in addressing the CVM benchmarks.
In order to address Bulgaria’s and Romania’s post-accession compliance record, it is important to 
distinguish compliance with EU legislation in terms of transposition, implementation and enforcement of 
EU law (general compliance) from compliance with the CVM benchmarks (or CVM compliance). Although 
both types of compliance are interlinked (the effectiveness of the judiciary will inevitably affect the 
implementation and enforcement of EU law), general compliance and CVM compliance operate within 
different frameworks. We can outline several important differences with respect to applicability and scope 
of conditions; monitoring and sanctions. Unlike the transposition and implementation of EU legislation 
with which all member states have to comply, the CVM is exclusively designed for and aimed at Bulgaria 
and Romania. Furthermore, the CVM benchmarks cover particular policy areas (fight against organized 
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crime and corruption and the efficiency of the judicial system) which lack internal EU consensus and firm 
legal basis in contrast to the application of EU law – which requires the transposition and implementation 
of EU legislation. Another important difference is the mode of monitoring compliance. It is possible that 
non-compliance with EU law is not detected (Börzel 2006) as the EU applies a decentralized monitoring 
mechanism, which relies heavily on private actors to raise complaints (Sedelmeier 2008). However, this is 
not the case with the CVM, as Strategic Objective Security and Justice Unit of the Commission’s Secretariat- 
General is responsible for monitoring and reporting on Bulgaria’s and Romania’s progress towards meeting 
the CVM benchmarks every six months. Last but not least, the EU relies on different sanctions. If a member 
state fails to comply with EU law, the Commission is entitled to initiate an infringement procedure against 
the relevant member state pursuant to Article 258 (Treaty of Lisbon) and may refer the case to Court 
of Justice of the European Union. According to the Commission’s decisions establishing the CVM “the 
Commission may apply safeguard measures based on articles 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession” if Bulgaria 
and/or Romania fail to address the benchmarks adequately (European Commission 2006d: 3, 2006e: 3).
On the basis of the comparative differentiation, we can define the CVM as individual sets of conditions, 
which Bulgaria and Romania must meet after their accession to the Union, linked to particular sanctions 
and operationalized in a framework of rigorous monitoring. By establishing the CVM, the Commission has 
not only confirmed the evolutionary nature of EU enlargement conditionality, but also extended its scope 
by introducing a new significant development – post-accession conditionality. As the aim of the article is 
to look at the main features, limitations and effectiveness of post-accession conditionality, it is important 
to note that effectiveness of the CVM is used interchangeably with effectiveness of post-accession 
conditionality. Therefore, the examination of post-accession conditionality is limited to the conditions and 
sanctions established in the framework of the CVM. The article measures effectiveness in terms of the 
progress of the Bulgarian and Romanian governments towards meeting the CVM benchmarks for the first 
three years of the application of the mechanism – 2007-2009. Although some research suggests that the 
mechanism is very effective at the level of public opinion and civil society (Primatarova 2010), the national 
governments, for which the mechanism was specifically designed, have not managed to meet the CVM 
benchmarks.
2.1  Stage-Structured Conditionality Model for Comparative Examination of EU    
 Enlargement Conditionality
In order to identify the key features of post-accession conditionality and to evaluate (in comparative 
perspective) their effectiveness, the article follows an inclusive approach to EU enlargement conditionality. 
Membership conditionality (Smith 2003, 2004), accession conditionality (Grabbe 2002, 2006), enlargement 
conditionality (Hughes et al. 2004), acquis conditionality (Grabbe 2002; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 
2004), democratic conditionality (Pridham 2002; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 
2004) and political conditionality (Smith 1998) are some of the categories of conditionality defined in the 
theoretical literature on European integration. However, the conceptual model does not distinguish between 
different categories of EU enlargement conditionality on the basis of the context of their application. The 
stage-structured conditionality model establishes a framework for comparative examination of EU pre-
accession and post-accession conditionality by relating the examination of EU enlargement conditionality 
to the stages of the accession process.
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Although the European Union has not formally established the stages of the process, some of the 
achievements on the way to accession are regarded as key turning points. The first step which has strong 
political significance is the formal agreement of the European Council on the membership perspective of 
the potential candidate country. The next milestone which intensifies the relations between the EU and 
the aspiring member state is the opening of the accession negotiations. The conclusion of the accession 
negotiations is another turning point, which is central to the dynamics of the process. Finally, the 
accession of the new member state to the EU marks the completion of the process. On the bases of these 
achievements, the theoretical model outlines the following four distinct stages of the accession process:
  • Pre-negotiation stage;
  • Negotiation stage;
  • Accession stage;
  • Post-accession stage.
The pre-negotiation stage starts with the formal agreement of the European Council on the membership 
perspective of the potential candidate country and ends with the start of the accession negotiations. 
Although making a formal application for EU membership is considered to be the first step of the accession 
process, the EU’s experience of the fifth and the ongoing enlargement indicates that this is not always 
the case. The relations between the Union and the CEECs as well as the Western Balkan countries started 
to develop in a framework of enlargement conditionality after the confirmation of their membership 
perspective, which was prior to their formal applications.2 As the accession negotiations intensify the 
dynamics of the relations between the EU and the candidate country, the stage-structured conditionality 
model specifies that the second stage of the enlargement process coincides with the negotiations. The 
third stage includes the period after the conclusion of the membership talks and before the formal 
accession of a country to the Union. The accession stage includes the signing of the Accession Treaty and 
its ratification and it is characterized by thorough examination of the would-be-member’s compliance 
with EU conditions. The fourth stage refers to the period after the accession of a candidate country to the 
EU. However, defining the exact timeframe of the post-accession stage is difficult. The safeguard clauses, 
included in the Act of Accession for the countries which became members in 2004, attached significant 
relevance to the post-accession stage by specifying that the safeguard measures may be applied “until the 
end of a period of up to three years after accession” (Official Journal 2003a). Although the Act of Accession 
for Bulgaria and Romania included the same safeguard clauses (with the exception of the postponement 
clause), the establishment of the CVM and the conclusions of the latest reports that the mechanism “needs 
to be maintained until these reforms are achieved” (European Commission 2009c, 2009d) extended the 
post-accession stage beyond the period of three years after accession. Therefore, the model specifies that 
the post-accession stage starts with accession of a state to the EU and ends with the suspension of any 
post-accession monitoring mechanism or, in the absence of any post-accession monitoring mechanism, 
with the expiry of the applicability of the safeguard measures included in the Treaty of Accession.
2 The EU confirmed the membership perspective of the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the 
Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. Hungary submitted its application for membership in March 1994, 
followed by Poland in April. Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria applied in 1995. The Czech 
Republic and Slovenia submitted their applications in 1996. The European Council in Santa Maria da Feira in June 
2000 stated that all Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) countries were potential candidates for EU mem-
bership. Croatia submitted its application in February 2003, Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
in March 2004.
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Before we move on to compare pre-accession and post-accession conditionality, we need to outline the 
key elements of EU enlargement conditionality. The theoretical literature highlights the significance of 
the conditions laid down by the EU as well as the particular benefits (rewards) which the applicant states 
receive as a result of their compliance (Smith 1998; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004; Schimmelfennig 
et al. 2003; Grabbe 2006). However, the completion of the fifth round of enlargement with the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe has proved that there are other elements which are also essential for the 
application of EU conditionality.
The stage-structured conditionality model specifies that EU enlargement conditionality has three key 
elements (see Table 1). The first element includes the conditions set out by the EU with which the country 
aspiring to membership needs to comply. The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 laid down the 
broad framework of membership conditions which must be satisfied before a country can join the Union. 
Since then, the EU has not only elaborated on the scope and the nature of conditions but also established 
strong links between fulfilling certain conditions and the advancement in the accession process. During the 
pre-negotiation stage the potential candidate country must satisfy two sets of conditions: conditions for 
applying for membership (or conditions of accession) and conditions for opening of accession negotiations. 
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets out the conditions for enlargement by stating that any 
European state which respects principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law may apply to become a member of the Union. The Helsinki European Council 
in December 1999 concluded that “compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen 
European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations” (Council of the European 
Union 1999). However, it is possible that the EU decides on country specific conditions. In addition to the 
fulfillment of the political criteria, the opening of negotiation with Bulgaria was conditional on the decision 
by the Bulgarian authorities on the closure dates for units 1-4 in the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant and economic 
reform progress, whereas the start of the negotiations with Romania was conditional on structural reform 
of child care institutions and implementation of appropriate measures to address the macro-economic 
situation (European Commission 1999a). In order to complete the accession negotiations, the candidate 
country needs to fulfill all the Copenhagen criteria. 
However, the provisional closure of each chapter depends on credible commitments concerning the 
alignment of legislation with the acquis and the administrative capacity to apply it properly. Additionally, 
the EU can establish specific conditions for closing a chapter, also known as closing benchmarks.3 
During the accession stage the EU urged the acceding countries to fully meet all the commitments and 
requirements arising from the accession negotiations and used intensified monitoring to highlight areas 
of serious concern. Furthermore, the date of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania was conditional on 
“the state of preparations for adoption and implementation of the acquis” (Official Journal 2005a). The 
establishment of CVM set a precedent as for the first time the EU decided on sets of conditions which 
must be fulfilled after accession. The Commission specified that Bulgaria must address six benchmarks 
and Romania four benchmarks.
3 In addition to the closing benchmarks, the EU introduced the application of opening benchmarks (certain condi-
tions which must be satisfied before the opening of chapters) as essential element of the renewed consensus on 
enlargement (with the Western Balkans and Turkey).
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Table 1: Stage-Structured (EU Enlargement) Conditionality Model
Stages Conditions Incentive structure Monitoring
Rewards Threats
Pre-
negotiation
- Conditions for applying for 
membership (conditions of 
accession);
- Conditions for opening 
Accession  Negotiations;
- Additional (country specific) 
conditions.
Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Providing membership 
perspective;
- Signing Association Agreement;   
- Implementing Association 
Agreement;
- Granting Candidate country 
status;
- Opening Accession 
Negotiations.
Financial rewards
Explicit threats:
Financial sanctions
Implicit threats
(delays of the accession 
advancement rewards)
Regular 
Progress 
Reports
Negotiation - Copenhagen criteria;
- Opening benchmarks 
(conditions for opening 
chapters);
- Closing benchmarks 
(conditions for closing 
chapters);
- 31/35 chapters;
- Areas of serious concern – 
highlighted in the monitoring 
reports.
Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Opening chapters;
- Closing chapters;
- Credible membership 
perspective;
- Completion of Accession 
Negotiations;
- Signing Accession Treaty.
Financial rewards
Explicit threats:
Financial sanctions
Implicit threats
(delays of the accession 
advancement rewards)
Regular 
Progress 
Reports
Accession - Copenhagen criteria;
- Areas of serious concern – 
highlighted in the monitoring 
reports.
Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Accession
Financial rewards
Explicit threats:
Preventive and remedial 
sanctions:
- Internal Market Safeguard 
Clause;
- JHA Safeguard Clause;
- Super Safeguard Clause;
- Additional clause(s).
Post-
accession
- Benchmarks – individual 
country specific conditions.
Financial rewards Explicit threats:
Preventive and remedial 
sanctions:
- Economic Safeguard Clause;
- Internal Market Safeguard 
Clause;
- JHA Safeguard Clause.
Progress 
Reports
Interim 
Reports
The EU has developed a wide range of incentives in order to induce compliance with its conditions. 
Although the Union has favored the use of carrots to sticks, it has established mechanisms for punishing 
non-compliance by introducing threats and the possibility of applying sanctions. The stage-structured 
conditionality model specifies that the second element of EU conditionality is the incentive structure, 
which examines the reward-threat balance. The model outlines two categories of rewards: accession 
advancement rewards which reflect the progress of the candidate country in the accession process and 
financial rewards (or financial assistance). The main accession advancement rewards include: granting 
                                  Post-Accession Conditionality  | 11
membership perspective; signing association agreement; implementing association agreement; granting 
candidate status; opening accession negotiations; opening a chapter; provisionally closing a chapter; 
credible membership perspective; completing accession negotiations; signing accession treaty; ratification 
of the accession treaty; accession to the European Union. The financial rewards refer to the financial 
assistance provided by the EU to the candidate country through the pre-accession financial instruments: 
PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA programs.4 
The stage-structured conditionality model divides the threats into two groups: implicit and explicit. The 
implicit threats sanction non-compliance by delaying the receiving of the accession advancement rewards. 
Bulgaria’s and Romania’s failure to sufficiently meet the Copenhagen criteria delayed the start of their 
accession negotiations.5 Subsequently, the Commission did not consider Bulgaria’s and Romania’s progress 
towards meeting the accession criteria sufficient to recommend the conclusion of the negotiations in 
2002 (European Commission 2002a, 2002b). Unlike implicit threats, explicit threats introduce specific 
penalizing measures. There are two types of explicit threats based on the nature of the measures which 
they introduce. The first type refers to financial sanctions which penalize non-compliance with EU rules 
by suspending or withdrawing funds. According to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 622/98 of 16 
March 1998:
“Where an element that is essential for continuing to grant pre-accession assistance is lacking, in 
particular when the commitments contained in the Europe Agreement are not respected and/
or progress towards fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may take appropriate steps with regard to 
any pre-accession assistance granted to an applicant State.” 
The Accession Partnerships between the EU and the candidate countries, which were the key feature of 
the enhanced pre-accession strategy, further specified that “failure to respect these general conditions 
could lead to a decision by the Council on the suspension of financial assistance”.6 The second type of 
explicit threats refers to preventive or remedial sanctions which include specific precautionary measures 
(safeguard measures). The EU has developed numerous precautionary measures ranging from economic 
and internal market safeguard clauses to specific measures in the areas of food safety and air safety. The 
preventive and remedial measures will be discussed in greater detail in the second part of the article.
4 Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Reconstructing their economies (PHARE) was orginally created in 1989 and 
expanded from Poland and Hungary to cover all CEECs. Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (SAPARD) and Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) were established in June 
1999, with the aim of addressing specific priorities, identified in the Accession Partnerships between the EU and 
the CEECs. Since 2007, the EU introduced a single framework for financial assistance – Instrument for Pre-acces-
sion Assistance (IPA). Bulgaria and Romania (together with Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia) failed to sufficiently 
satisfy the EU conditions for opening accession negotiations. The countries were excluded from the first group of 
countries which started the negotiations in 1998.
5 Bulgaria and Romania (together with Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia) failed to sufficiently satisfy the EU conditions 
for opening accession negotiations. The countries were excluded from the first group of countries which started 
the negotiations in 1998.
6 This clause is included in all the Accession Partnerships between the EU and the twelve applicant countries of 
the fifth enlargement.
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As the significance of monitoring applicants’ compliance with EU conditions has increased substantially 
since the publication of the first Regular Reports in 1998, the stage-structured conditionality model specifies 
that monitoring is the third key element of EU enlargement conditionality. The rigorous approach of the 
Commission to reporting on the progress made towards accession by each of the candidate countries 
(which were part of the fifth round of enlargement) as well as potential candidate countries (since 2005) 
has transformed the scope and nature of the Regular Reports from brief general assessment into detailed 
evaluation analysis. More importantly, it has helped the Commission establish unquestioned expertise in 
providing objective comprehensive assessment of the EU hopefuls’ compliance with EU conditions thus 
legitimizing the impartiality of the Commission’s recommendations. The Commission significantly increased 
the relevance of monitoring reports as it started to use them not only as a basis for its recommendations 
(whether to grant a reward or impose a sanction), but as an instrument for prioritizing conditions and 
as well as an instrument for establishing new conditions and introducing new threats. On the basis of 
the functions which the monitoring reports fulfill, the stage-structured conditionality model distinguishes 
between two groups of reports: evaluation reports and advanced reports. The evaluation reports include 
the monitoring reports which assess progress and/or prioritize conditions. The advanced reports refer to 
the report which in addition to evaluating progress, establish new conditions and/or threats.
The next part of the article analyzes the transformations of the key elements of EU conditionality before 
and after accession. The first section examines the evolution of EU conditions, the second section looks 
at the development of monitoring instruments, the last section analyses the transformations of the 
incentive structure. The pre-accession stages are not discussed in detail as the focus of the article is on 
the effectiveness of the CVM for Bulgaria and Romania.
3.  Comparative Examination of Pre-Accession and Post-Accession Conditionality
3.1  Comparative Examination of Pre-Accession and Post-Accession Conditions
The Commission’s decisions establishing the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification of progress 
in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime7 in Bulgaria and 
Romania set a precedent for the Union. For the very first time the EU introduced a special mechanism 
for monitoring new member states’ compliance with set criteria. The Commission specified that Bulgaria 
needs to address the following six benchmarks:
“(1) Adopt constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the independence and 
accountability of the judicial system.
(2) Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and implementing a new 
judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on the impact of these new laws and of 
the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial phase.
7 Fight against organized crime was an area established only for Bulgaria.
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(3) Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, accountability and 
efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results annually.
(4) Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level 
corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the publication of assets of 
high-level officials.
(5) Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders and within 
local government.
(6) Implement a strategy to fight organized crime, focusing on serious crime, money laundering as 
well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on new and ongoing investigations, 
indictments and convictions in these areas.” (European Commission 2006d)
The Commission established the following four benchmarks for Romania: 
“(1) Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process notably by enhancing the capacity and 
accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the new civil 
and penal procedures codes.
(2) Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, incompatibilities 
and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive 
sanctions can be taken.
(3) Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan investigations 
into allegations of high- level corruption.
(4) Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within the local 
government.” (European Commission 2006e)
The benchmarks illustrate two important features of post-accession conditionality. First, compared to the 
uniform conditions for applying for membership or the Copenhagen criteria, post-accession conditionality 
is highly differentiated as the EU introduced individual country specific conditions for Bulgaria and 
Romania. Second, the distinguishing approach of the Commission to addressing similar issues, particularly 
the establishment of different benchmarks in order to remedy similar shortcomings in the efficiency of 
the judicial process, highlights the increasing application of targeted conditionality. The July 2009 Progress 
Reports, which set out two lists of tasks8 for the new members, provided further evidence for the growing 
significance of differentiated and targeted conditionality. In July 2010 the Commission “while recalling 
the outstanding recommendations” invited Bulgaria and Romania to address ten new recommendations 
(European Commission 2010c, 2010d). 
The increasing application of differentiated and targeted conditionality highlights the evolutionary nature 
of EU enlargement conditionality. Furthermore, it reflects the Commission’s growing expertise in the 
candidate countries and new member states. More importantly, by establishing individual country specific 
8 See European Commission 2009c, 2009d.
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benchmarks, the Commission has managed to instrumentalize its knowledge. Benchmarking indicates 
that the Commission not only can identify a problem but it can provide detailed guidance on how the 
problem should be addressed. The increasing significance of targeted and differentiated conditionality for 
the ongoing enlargement round with the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey confirms that these 
features of EU conditionality are definitely an improvement in EU enlargement policy, and therefore, they 
cannot explain the limited effectiveness of post-accession conditionality.
3.2  Comparative Examination of Pre-Accession and Post-Accession Monitoring 
             Instruments
As Table 2 illustrates, during the pre-negotiation and the negotiation stage the Commission prepared and 
published seven annual Regular Reports on the progress of Bulgaria and Romania towards membership. 
The accession stage indicates an interesting change. Although the 2004 Enlargement Strategy Paper 
provided that “the Commission will issue yearly comprehensive monitoring reports”, the May 2006 Report 
did not make any recommendations on the accession date and confirmed that the Commission would 
prepare another report (European Commission 2004c, 2006c).
In the end, the Commission issued three monitoring reports on the state of preparedness for EU membership 
of Bulgaria and Romania instead of two (yearly) monitoring reports as had been envisaged. As one EU 
official recollected “[w]e were postponing the final decision on the effective date of accession as much as 
it was feasible until early autumn of 2006” (Interview 1 2009). The official noted that “[i]deally we would 
have pushed and kept the constructive uncertainty, if you would like, until December 2006 but in practice 
you cannot do that” (Interview 1 2009). The introduction of the CVM not only allowed the EU to continue 
to put political pressure on the two countries but intensified further the monitoring process. According 
to Article 1 of the decisions establishing the mechanism, the Commission would report “when required 
and at least every six months” (European Commission 2006d, 2006e). The Commission has published six 
sets of Progress Reports under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. Unlike the Progress Reports, 
the Interim Reports present a factual update of progress without providing a detailed assessment of 
results achieved under each of the benchmarks. Furthermore, the Commission has introduced additional 
supporting documents such as technical updates and funds management reports.
Another key development in the EU’s approach towards monitoring is the growing use of monitoring 
reports as instruments for introducing new conditions or threats. On the basis of the stage-structured 
conditionality model, we can refer to this process as growing use of advanced reports. Table 2 illustrates 
that during the pre-negotiation and the negotiation stage the Commission did not issue any advanced 
reports. The first reports to establish sets of conditions were the May 2006 Monitoring Reports. The 
Commission concluded that Bulgaria needed to address urgently 16 areas of serious concern, whereas 
Romania needed to address 14 areas of serious concern. The September 2006 Monitoring Reports 
highlighted six areas for Bulgaria and four areas for Romania and provided the basis for the establishment 
of the CVM benchmarks. The July 2009 Progress Reports and July 2010 Progress Reports, which set out 
lists of tasks and recommendations for the new members, provide further evidence for the growing use 
of advanced reports.
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Table 2: Comparative Examination of Monitoring Instruments
Stages Reports Bulgaria Romania
Evaluation
Reports
Advanced
Reports
Evaluation
Reports
Advanced
Reports
Pre-
negotiation
1998 Regular Report √ √
1999 Regular Report √ √
Negotiation 2000 Regular Report √ √
2001 Regular Report √ √
2002 Regular Report √ √
2003 Regular Report √ √
2004 Regular Report √ √
Accession 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report √ √
May 20006 Monitoring Report √ √
September 2006 Monitoring Report √ √
Post- accession June 2007 Progress Report √ √
February 2008 Interim Report √ √
July 2008 Progress Report √ √
July 2008 Technical Update √ √
July 2008 Funds Management Report √
February 2009 Interim Report √ √
July 2009 Progress Report √ √
July 2009 Technical Update √ √
March 2010 Interim Report √ √
July 2010 Progress Report √ √
July 2010 Technical Update √ √
The comparative analysis of pre-accession and post-accession monitoring instruments illustrates the 
increasing relevance of monitoring and also highlights the evolutionary nature of EU enlargement 
conditionality. The CVM intensifies significantly the monitoring process by establishing a comprehensive 
framework for rigorous post-accession monitoring. Furthermore, by increasing the scope and more 
importantly the frequency of the reports, the Commission provides an instrument for continuous political 
pressure. As national officials from the Permanent Representations of the members states to the EU 
pointed out, every six months, the publication of the Progress or Interim Reports attracts a lot of media 
attention not only in Bulgaria and Romania but also in old member states like the Netherlands and Germany. 
CVM exemplifies the complex evolutionary nature of the monitoring process. In addition to fulfilling the 
functions of assessment tools, the monitoring reports provide the basis for further recommendations; 
establish new conditions or introduce new threats; act as a means of communication between the EU and 
candidate countries (or new member states); and last but not least provide an instrument for continuous 
political pressure. The examination of monitoring underlines the advances of the thorough post-accession 
monitoring, thus confirming that monitoring cannot account for the limited effectiveness of post-accession 
conditionality. The next section analyses the transformation of the incentive structure.
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3.3  Comparative Examination of Pre-Accession and Post-Accession Incentive        
 Structure
Table 3 provides a summary of the incentive structure for Bulgaria and Romania. When we compare the 
pre-accession stages and the post-accession stage, there are several important differences. First, after the 
accession of the new member state, the rewards provided by the Union for compliance with its conditions 
are limited to financial rewards. It is important to note that most of the post-accession financial assistance 
is part of the financial assistance previously agreed upon and allocated in the framework of the pre-
accession programs (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD). During the post-accession stage, the EU is “stripped” of its 
strongest incentive for inducing compliance – the membership perspective. Furthermore, all the accession 
advancement rewards are no longer available as a result of the accession of the new member state to the 
Union. In contrast with the pre-accession stages, the EU provides few rewards for Bulgaria and Romania 
to comply with the benchmarks set by the CVM.
The comparative examination on the nature and the scope of threats highlights another interesting 
distinction. After accession, the EU does not rely on the use of implicit threats to induce compliance with 
its conditions. However, the lack of implicit threats is compensated by the establishment of a wide range of 
explicit threats. Before we examine the scope of the explicit threats established by the CVM, it is essential 
that we distinguish between the preventive and remedial sanctions established in the framework of post-
accession conditionality and the sanctions which are applicable to all member states (e.g. infringement 
procedures).
The most serious sanction which the EU can apply to any member state is the activation of Article 7 of 
the TEU. According to the provisions of the article in the event of a clear threat of a serious breach of the 
founding principles of the Union:
“the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from 
the application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the 
representative of the government of that Member State in the Council.”
Other measures applicable to any member state include financial correction of EU funds and infringement 
procedures (European Commission 2006: 7). In order to differentiate these measures from the financial 
sanctions developed in the framework of EU enlargement conditionality, we classify them as general 
financial sanctions. Before we analyze the impact of the general financial sanctions imposed on Bulgaria 
and Romania, we will examine the range of the post-accession preventive and remedial sanctions.
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Table 3: Comparative Examination of Incentive structure for Bulgaria and Romania 
Stages Bulgaria Romania
Rewards Threats Rewards Threats
Pre-
negotiation
Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Providing membership 
perspective;
- Signing Association 
Agreement;    
- Implementing 
Association Agreement;
- Granting Candidate 
country status;
- Opening Accession 
Negotiations.
Financial rewards
Explicit threats:
Financial sanctions
Implicit threats
(delays of the accession 
advancement rewards)
Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Providing membership 
perspective;
- Signing Association 
Agreement;                         
- Implementing 
Association Agreement;
- Granting Candidate 
country status;
- Opening Accession 
Negotiations.
Financial rewards
Explicit threats:
Financial sanctions
Implicit threats
(delays of 
the accession 
advancement 
rewards)
Negotiation Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Opening chapters;
- Closing chapters;
- Credible membership 
perspective;
- Completion of 
Accession Negotiations;
- Signing Accession 
Treaty.
Financial assistance
Explicit threats:
Financial sanctions
Implicit threats
(delays of the accession 
advancement rewards)
Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Opening chapters;
- Closing chapters;
- Credible membership 
perspective;
- Completion of Accession 
Negotiations;
- Signing Accession Treaty.
Financial rewards
Explicit threats:
Financial sanctions
Implicit threats
(delays of 
the accession 
advancement 
rewards)
Accession Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Accession 
Financial rewards
Explicit threats:
Preventive and 
remedial sanctions:
- Internal Market 
Safeguard Clause;
- JHA Safeguard Clause;
- Super Safeguard Clause.
Accession advancement 
rewards:
- Accession
Financial rewards
Explicit threats:
Preventive and 
remedial sanctions:
- Internal Market 
Safeguard Clause;
- JHA Safeguard 
Clause;
- Super Safeguard 
Clause;
- Additional 
postponement 
clause.
Post-
accession
Financial rewards Explicit threats:
Preventive and 
remedial sanctions:
- Economic Safeguard 
Clause;
- Internal Market 
Safeguard Clause;
- JHA Safeguard Clause.
Financial rewards Explicit threats:
Preventive and 
remedial sanctions:
- Economic Safeguard 
Clause;
- Internal Market 
Safeguard Clause;
- JHA Safeguard 
Clause.
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The Treaty of Accession includes three safeguard clauses: one general economic safeguard clause and 
two specific safeguard clauses: internal market and justice and home affairs (JHA) safeguard clause. The 
economic safeguard clause9 allows member states to apply for authorization to take protective measures 
with regard to Bulgaria and Romania in the event of serious economic difficulties.10 Article 37 of the Act of 
Accession specifies that the Commission may establish appropriate measures if Bulgaria and/or Romania 
cause, or risk causing, a serious breach of the functioning of the internal market. This safeguard clause 
refers not only to the internal market but also to all sectoral policies which concern economic activities with 
cross-border effect (e.g. competition, agriculture, transport, telecommunications, energy, environment 
etc.). According to Article 38 of the Act of Accession, the Commission may establish appropriate measures 
if there are serious shortcomings or any imminent risk of such shortcomings in the transposition and 
implementation of the acquis in the area of justice and home affairs. The safeguard clauses can be 
activated “until the end of a period of up to three years after accession” (Official Journal 2005a). However, 
the internal market and the JHA safeguard clause “may be invoked even before accession” (Official Journal 
2005a). The establishment of the CVM further specifies that if Bulgaria and/or Romania
“fail to address the benchmarks adequately, the Commission may apply safeguard measures based on 
articles 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession, including the suspension of Member States’ obligation to 
recognise and execute, under the conditions laid down in Community law, Bulgarian judgments and 
judicial decisions, such as European arrest warrants” (European Commission 2006d: 3, 2006e: 3).
As the benchmarks set out for Bulgaria and Romania refer to certain shortcomings in the areas of judicial 
reform and the fight against corruption, failure to sufficiently address these issues would have resulted in 
the activation of the JHA safeguard clause. However, even when the monitoring report confirmed that “[t]
he assessment points to the serious difficulties which the Bulgarian authorities are facing in making real 
headway in judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime” and that “there are few 
results to demonstrate that the system is actually functioning correctly”, the Commission concluded that 
it “considers support to be more effective than sanctions and will not invoke the safeguard provisions set 
out in the Accession Treaty” (European Commission 2008c: 6). The Commission’s decision not to activate 
any of the safeguard measures is directly related to the scope of the explicit threats and more precisely to 
the penalizing power of the remedial and preventive sanctions established by the safeguard clauses.
There are two main arguments against the imposition of the safeguard clauses. The first refers to the 
limitations and the inadequacies of the sanctions included in the safeguards. As one EU official noted “it 
was never seriously envisaged to invoke the safeguard clauses because the clauses from the very beginning 
were considered not to be very constructive” (Interview 2 2009). The activation of the justice and home 
affairs safeguard clause would have suspended cooperation in these areas and particularly the application 
of the European Arrest Warrant. Another EU official noted that “the discontinuation of cooperation in the 
judicial field would have contributed nothing to achieve the ultimate aim” and concluded that the JHA 
safeguard clause “is not a real threat” and that “maybe for a government it is a sanction because it is not 
9 Article 36 (See Official Journal 2005a).
10 Bulgaria and Romania may also apply for the authorization to take protective measures with regard to other 
member states.
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helpful for one’s prestige but apart from considerations of prestige, there is no real material penalty or 
sanction” (Interview 1 2009). Another EU official remarked that, “compared to the political exposure, this 
[JHA safeguard] is a Mickey Mouse clause” (Interview 3 2009).
The second argument reflects the difficulties activating the safeguards and the implications of their 
activation. In contrast with the pre-accession stages when the Council decides unanimously whether to 
grant rewards and/or impose sanctions, after accession, the Commission decides on the imposition of 
the safeguard clauses. A debate about the activation of the safeguard clauses and particularly the JHA 
safeguard clause is likely to polarize the opinions within the college, thus making it very difficult to reach 
a decision. The imposition of any of the safeguard provisions would have damaged severely not only the 
reputation of Bulgaria and/or Romania but also the reputation of the Commission. Furthermore, it would 
have discredited the EU’s decision to let Bulgaria and Romania become members in 2007 and would have 
weakened the otherwise declining support for the ongoing enlargement with Turkey and the Western 
Balkan countries, which face similar problems in the areas of the efficiency of judiciary and the fight 
against corruption. As one EU official noted “[t]he mechanism is a huge credibility issue for the Union” 
and pointed out that “the disadvantages of activating [the JHA safeguard clause] outweigh the advantages” 
(Interview 2 2009).
Although the remedial and preventive sanction introduced by the JHA safeguard clause is considered 
limited and inadequate, some member states have pushed for its activation. Not only the Commission 
but also the member states have used the CVM to put political pressure on Bulgaria and Romania. The 
Dutch Minister of EU affairs Frans Timmermans, in an unprecedented move, sent a letter11 to the Justice 
Commissioner Jacques Barrot, asking the Commission to consider activating the JHA safeguard clause 
should the reports fail to register sufficient progress (Euractiv 2009a). It is to be noted that Timmermans’ 
letter was the first and the last attempt at imposing the safeguard clauses, as the applicability of their 
sanctions expired at the end of 2009 (three years after accession). The July 2009 Progress Reports 
concluded that “the conditions for invoking the safeguard clauses are not fulfilled” and confirmed that 
the mechanism “needs to be maintained until the reforms are achieved” (European Commission 2009c: 
6-8, 2009d: 6-9). It is worth mentioning that prior to the publication of the reports the EU considered 
enhancing the penalizing power of the CVM by introducing new explicit threats. There were discussions 
in the Commission for linking the removal of the CVM with Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the 
Schengen Area. The opinions within the college diverged and the idea was abandoned (Euractiv 2009b). 
However, progress in the areas highlighted by the Commission is essential for new members’ accession to 
the borderless area. As one EU official noted “[i]f the mechanism continues and in particular with negative 
assessment, it will be extremely difficult to achieve a consensus in the Council for Bulgaria and Romania 
to access to Schengen” (Interview 2 2009).
The Commission neither invoked any of the remedial and preventive sanctions included in the safeguard 
provisions nor established new sanctions in the framework of the CVM. However, general financial 
sanctions, based on standard policy procedures, have been imposed against both Bulgaria and Romania. 
The publication of the Commission’s most critical Progress Report on Bulgaria (in July 2008) was 
11 The letter was sent on 30 May 2009, prior to the publication of the July 2009 Progress Reports. 
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accompanied by a separate report on Bulgaria’s funds management which concluded that “[m]onitoring 
and audits show serious weaknesses in the management and control systems and point to a number of 
irregularities, suspected fraud cases and conflicts of interest between the programme administration and 
contractors” (European Commission 2008e: 3). As a result, the Commission withdrew the accreditation of 
the two implementing agencies in Bulgaria – the Central Financing and Contracting Unit (CFCU) and the 
Implementing Agency at the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Work (MRDPW) and suspended 
EU funds worth over €500 million (European Commission 2008e). The Commission decided not to reverse its 
decisions and Bulgaria irreversibly lost €220 million of pre-accession EU funding in November 2008, which 
was the final deadline for the contracting of PHARE funds (Euobserver 2008). Although the Commission 
did not publish a separate report on Romania, it suspended agricultural payments worth €142 million in 
June 2008 (Euobserver 2009). The suspension of the EU funds (in both countries) was related to general 
weaknesses in administrative and judicial capacity as well as high level corruption.
However, the EU’s decision not to activate any of the safeguard procedures but to apply financial regulations 
highlights the limitations of the remedial and preventive sanctions, established in the framework of 
post-accession conditionality. Although some member states asked for a strong link between failure to 
adequately address the benchmarks and the suspension of EU funds, the Commission refrained from 
establishing any legal links between the two. As one EU official commented “[w]e cannot legally punish 
Bulgaria and Romania by withdrawing funds” (Interview 2 2009). The recent developments in Bulgaria and 
Romania (since the suspension of the EU funds) suggest that general financial sanctions have a positive 
impact. One EU official noted that “[t]he decision to cut funding has been a very strong motivation for the 
Bulgarian government last year” and commented that “[i]t is only pressure and punishment that works, 
if you take the money away, they feel the heat” (Interview 2 2009). This is further evidence that during 
post-accession stage the remedial and preventive sanctions established by the CVM do not provide strong 
incentives for compliance with EU conditions.
The comparative examination of pre-accession and post-accession reward-threat balance highlights 
the significant transformation of the incentive structure. In stark contrast with the pre-negotiation 
and the negotiation stage, when the reward-threat balance is dominated by a wide range of accession 
advancement and financial rewards after accession explicit threats and particularly remedial and 
preventive sanctions prevail in the reward-threat balance. The alteration in the balance between rewards 
and threats illustrates the transformation from positive incentive structure to negative incentive structure. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the safeguard clauses highlights the limited penalizing power of the remedial 
and preventive sanctions which they included. On the basis of the limitations and the inadequacies of 
the sanctions, we can conclude that the post-accession negative incentive structure is very weak. The 
substantial transformation of the incentive structure – from strong positive incentive structure to very 
weak negative incentive structure – highlights the key weaknesses of post-accession conditionality, which 
limit its effectiveness.
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4. Conclusion: Limitations of Post-Accession Conditionality and the Future of EU            
 Enlargement Conditionality
Three years after their EU accession to the EU, Bulgaria and Romania are still subject to unprecedented post-
accession monitoring. Although some steps have been taken, the pace of reforms in the areas of judiciary 
and fight against corruption is slow. The latest reports highlighted “important shortcomings in Romania’s 
efforts to achieve progress under the CVM” and criticized the country for the adoption of a new law on the 
National Integrity Agency (ANI) which “represents a significant step back in the fight against corruption and 
breaches commitments Romania has taken upon accession” (European Commission 2010d: 5). Although 
the Commission praised Bulgaria for “a strong reform momentum which has been established” since July 
2009, the Progress Report detected “continuing shortcomings regarding the prevention of corruption and 
protection against conflict of interest”, concluding that “important deficiencies remain in judicial practice 
both at the level of the prosecution and at the level of the court” (European Commission 2010c: 3).
The comparative examination of pre-accession and post-accession conditionality on the basis of the stage-
structured conditionality model highlights several important developments. Two of the key elements of EU 
enlargement conditionality – conditions and monitoring – have evolved significantly. The introduction of 
post-accession benchmarks and the intensification of monitoring process represent the logical steps in the 
evolution of EU enlargement policy based on the lessons learnt from the previous experiences. The growing 
application of targeted and differentiated conditionality and advanced monitoring reports confirms the 
usefulness of the EU’s improved approach towards establishing conditions and monitoring compliance. 
The examination of the third element of EU enlargement conditionality – the incentive structure – reveals 
the key weaknesses of post-accession conditionality. After accession, the EU is “stripped” of its attractive 
accession advancement rewards and can only rely on explicit threats to induce compliance. However, 
the limited penalizing power of the remedial and preventive sanctions established in the framework of 
the CVM produces very weak negative incentive structure which diminishes the effectiveness of post-
accession conditionality.
The July 2009 Progress Reports confirmed that the Commission “sees all the benchmarks as closely 
interlinked” and that it “[d]oes not envisage removing the benchmarks one by one but rather working 
with Bulgaria [and Romania] to the point where the CVM in its entirety is ended” (European Commission 
2009c: 2, 2009d: 2). Although neither Bulgaria nor Romania have fully satisfied the CVM benchmarks, the 
Commission and some member states have successfully used the CVM as an instrument for continuous 
political pressure. As one EU official noted “without the mechanism the situation would be much worse” 
(Interview 2 2009). The question about the future of the CVM is important not only to Bulgaria and 
Romania, but also to prospective and old members of the Union. The mechanism has become a credibility 
issue not only for Sofia and Bucharest and the Commission, but an argument against further enlargement. 
The applicability of the safeguard clauses expired on 1 January 2010 and the Commission did not introduce 
any new sanctions but the CVM was not revoked, despite lobbying from both capitals for an exit strategy. 
Whether the EU can induce far reaching judicial reform and strengthen the fight against corruption in the 
absence of accession advancement rewards and remedial and preventive sanctions remains to be seen.
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The effectiveness of the CVM has implications not only for the enlargement policy of the EU but for the 
development of cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs. There have been proposals for the introduction 
of similar monitoring mechanism for all members in order to encourage judicial cooperation and ensure 
high standards of quality of justice systems. However, the extension of the post-accession monitoring 
mechanism to the next country to join the EU – Croatia – is not envisaged. The new Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner, Štefan Füle, confirmed that “[s]peculation about an eventual 
monitoring mechanism [for Croatia] does not have any place” (Euractiv 2010). As the support for the 
enlargement of the Union with Turkey and Western Balkan countries has declined significantly, it is very 
likely that EU conditionality will evolve further by establishing more demanding conditions, serious explicit 
threats and substantial remedial and preventive sanctions before the accession of any new member. The 
conceptual framework, established by the stage-structured conditionality model, allows us not only to 
compare pre-accession and post-accession conditionality but also helps us to trace key developments in 
EU enlargement conditionality. The model can be applied in a wider context, to examine comparatively 
different rounds of EU enlargement and to compliment research in the field of democratization and 
Europeanization studies.
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